About Machines and the Moral Community.
| Authors | Neely, Erica |
|---|---|
| Date | 2014 |
| Publication | Philosophy & Technology |
| Publisher | Springer Nature |
| Vol / Pages | Vol. 27 No. 1 pp. 97-111 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s13347-013-0114-y |
| URL | https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=20f1a441-a6be-396a-8fe9-9b41f960a159 |
| Language | eng |
Type: Journal Article
Tags: Artificial intelligence, Autonomy (Psychology), Ethics, Generosity, Reason, Self-consciousness (Awareness)
Abstract
A key distinction in ethics is between members and nonmembers of the moral community. Over time, our notion of this community has expanded as we have moved from a rationality criterion to a sentience criterion for membership. I argue that a sentience criterion is insufficient to accommodate all members of the moral community; the true underlying criterion can be understood in terms of whether a being has interests. This may be extended to conscious, self-aware machines, as well as to any autonomous intelligent machines. Such machines exhibit an ability to formulate desires for the course of their own existence; this gives them basic moral standing. While not all machines display autonomy, those which do must be treated as moral patients; to ignore their claims to moral recognition is to repeat past errors. I thus urge moral generosity with respect to the ethical claims of intelligent machines.
